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Abstract
This study theoretically examines green portfolio standards with monetary penalties
in an oligopoly market. We find that green portfolio standards are inefficient policy tools
if the purpose of the government is to promote green products, whereas they attain first-
best optimality if the purpose is to restrict non-green products. Green portfolio standards
may work well under the mixed aims of promoting green and restricting non-green prod-
ucts. Moreover, by applying the principle of our results, we highlight the inefficiency of an
employment promotion program for handicapped workers in Japan.
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Global warming is a hot issue in both politics and academics. A standard policy for environ-
mental problems is the introduction of carbon pricing, such as emission taxes and tradable
emission permits. Several theoretical studies in environmental economics encourage the use
of these instruments from the perspective of cost-effectiveness, and in fact, many countries
have adopted carbon pricing policies. Nevertheless, both in the presence and absence of car-
bon pricing policies, many other (additional) environmental policies have been widely adopted
(Bőhringer et al., 2017; Cohen and Keiser, 2017; and Demirel et al., 2018). Portfolio standard
policies that impose targets for the ratio of green products among all products are one such
environmental policy and are widely adopted across countries and industries.
There are two possible rationales for introducing green portfolio standards. One is to
control negative externalities of gray products, which are not internalized by carbon pricing.
For example, an increase in non-zero emission vehicles or coal-fired power plants may be harmful
for the local environment as well as the global environment. The second rationale is to promote
positive externalities of green products. For example, an increase in zero emission vehicles or
renewable plants may improve social awareness of green activities and create additional gain
as public service announcement. Zero emission vehicles, such as electric vehicles and fuel cell
vehicles, and renewable plants, such as wind power generators, require many inputs, and an
increase in these products may create new industries. Thus, the government may use green
portfolio standards as industry policies.1
In this study, we show that green portfolio standards work well to internalize the negative
externality of gray products. However, the standards are not efficient if the purpose of the
policies is only to internalize positive externalities of green products. Green portfolio standards
may work well under the mixed purposes of promoting green and restricting non-green products,
if the negative externality related to the latter purpose is sufficiently large.
Bento et al. (2018) established an important contribution in this field. They formulated
1Lyon and Yin (2010), Schmalensee (2012), and Jenner et al. (2012) noted that adoption of renewable
portfolio standard policies has been at least partially driven by promoting renewable energy rather than reducing
emissions.
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a general equilibrium model that examines the two effects of promoting green products and
restricting emissions. The authors showed that renewable portfolio standards can yield either
large renewable resource booms or large emissions savings but not both. There are two differ-
ences between our study and theirs. First, we investigate an imperfectly competitive market,
whereas they discussed a perfectively competitive market. Second, we discuss the first-best
optimality of green portfolio standard policies, whereas they did not discuss the optimality of
green portfolio standard policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section formulates our model in which
firms are subject to the portfolio standard for green outputs in an oligopoly market. Section
3 provides our main results. In Section 4, we apply the portfolio standard to labor inputs and
discuss the inefficiency of an employment promotion program of handicapped workers in Japan.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an n-firm symmetric oligopoly market wherein firms choose their outputs (Cournot
competition). There are two differentiated products, green and gray products. In the context
of renewable portfolio standards, the green product is electricity produced by renewable power
plants. In the context of zero-emission vehicle programs, the green product is a zero-emission
vehicle, such as an electric vehicle or a fuel cell vehicle. Each firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) chooses





i=1 yi be the total output of the gray and green products, respectively, and let pX and pY
be the price of the gray and green products, respectively. Let c(xi, yi) be the firm i’s production
cost function. It is twice continuously differentiable, convex, and satisfies ∂c/∂xi > 0 and
∂c/∂yi > 0. Let b(xi, yi) be the private (internalized without green portfolio standards) benefit
function from the green output. It is twice continuously differentiable, convex, ∂b/∂xi ≤ 0,
and ∂b/∂yi ≥ 0. For instance, an increase in yi may improve the firm’s reputation and the firm
may be able to raise funds with lower capital costs.
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The government regulates the ratio of green output as yi/(xi + yi) ≥ r, where r ∈ [0, 1].2
Firms that fall short of the green output targets pay the penalty (or procure permits) according
to the level of shortage (i.e., yi − r(xi + yi) = rxi − (1− r)yi), and firms that overachieve the
targets receive the subsidy (or sell permits). Let t ≥ 0 be the level of the unit penalty (subsidy).3
The government first chooses t and r, and then firms compete in the product markets.
The green (gray) product may yield positive (negative) externalities that the government
is concerned with. Let B(X,Y ) denote the social benefit due to the externalities. We assume
that it is twice continuously differentiable, convex, and satisfies ∂B/∂X ≤ 0 and ∂B/∂Y ≥ 0.
If ∂B/∂X = 0 and ∂B/∂Y > 0, the government should internalize the positive externalities
of green products, that is, the policy purpose is to promote green products. If ∂B/∂X < 0
and ∂B/∂Y = 0, the government should internalize the negative externalities of gray products,
that is, the policy purpose is to restrict gray products. If ∂B/∂X < 0 and ∂B/∂Y > 0, the
government has a mixed purpose.
The demand system of these two products is obtained by the following representative (ag-
gregate) consumer problem, which maximizes quasi-linear utility:
max
X,Y,M
U(X,Y ) +M s.t. pXX + pY Y +M ≤ I,
where M ≥ 0 is the consumption of an outside good (numeraire) that is competitively provided
(with a unitary price) and I is income that consists of profits of firms in the industry and fixed
income from outside the industry. We assume that the sub-utility U is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly concave, and increasing. Each consumer is a price taker. From the




(X,Y ) k = X,Y, (1)
2This regulation is equivalent to xi/(xi + yi) ≤ 1 − r. If we regard xi as emissions generated from the gray
output and (1 − r) as the upper limit of emissions per unit of output, the green portfolio standard policy is
similar to the emission intensity regulation. For the relationship between the two policies, see Ino and Matsumura
(2019b). For a discussion of the welfare effects of emission intensity regulation, see Helfand, (1991), Farzin (2003),
Lahiri and Ono (2007), Holland et al. (2009), Ino and Matsumura (2019a), and Hirose and Matsumura (2020).
3If tradable permits of green products rather than direct pricing by the government is introduced, t is the
equilibrium price of the permit, and the government can control the price by issuing additional permits or by
purchasing permits from firms that overachieved the targets.
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that is, we obtain the inverse demand system, pX(X,Y ) and pY (X,Y ). Note that the strict
concavity of U implies downward slopes for this demand (i.e., ∂pX/∂X = ∂U
2/∂2X < 0 and
∂pY /∂Y = ∂U
2/∂2Y < 0). We assume that the two products are substitutes (i.e., ∂pX/∂Y =
∂pY /∂X = ∂U
2/∂X∂Y ≤ 0). Moreover, we assume that an increase of X reduces pX more
significantly than pY (i.e., ∂pX/∂X ≤ ∂pX/∂Y and ∂pY /∂Y ≤ ∂pY /∂X). These are standard
assumptions in the literature on oligopoly markets (Vives, 1999).
Firm i’s profit is
πi ≡ pX(X,Y )xi + pY (X,Y )yi − c(xi, yi) + b(xi, yi)− t[rxi − (1− r)yi].
Social welfare is
W ≡ U(X,Y )−
n∑
i=1
(c(xi, yi)− b(xi, yi)) +B(X,Y ).
3 Results
























+ t(1− r) = 0. (3)
Assuming a unique interior solution, these conditions lead to the market equilibrium outcomes.





















where we use (1). Assuming a unique interior solution, these conditions lead to the socially









MDX (MBY ) is the marginal damage (benefit) of negative (positive) externality caused by an
increase in the gray (green) product at the socially optimal point.
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We now present our results.








the socially optimal outcome is not achieved by the green portfolio standard policy.
(ii) If (6) is not satisfied, the socially optimal outcome is achieved by




























Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1(i) implies that if no negative externality of gray products exists (i.e., MDX =
0), the portfolio standard policy is never optimal. In other words, if the policy purpose is only
to promote green products rather than to restrict gray products, a portfolio standard policy is
inefficient.
If (6) is satisfied, welfare loss of suboptimal production caused by firms’ market power (right-
hand side) dominates welfare loss caused by negative externality of gray products (left-hand
side). Therefore, the production of gray products should be stimulated rather than restricted.
A green portfolio standard policy restricts production of gray products and thus, it accelerates
the loss of underproduction, which is not optimal.
Proposition 1(ii) suggests that the green portfolio standards work well unless the negative
externality effect of gray products is too small. Proposition 1(ii) states that the optimal unit
penalty on firms that do not meet the targets increases with the sum of the marginal social
benefit of green products and the marginal social damage of gray products. Proposition 1(ii)
also suggests that the greater the marginal benefit of green products is, the lower (higher) the
target level of green products ratio (the penalty price) should be. An increase in t directly
increases the incentive of green product production, whereas an increase in r may reduce it
because it raises production costs in the industry. Therefore, when the positive externality
of green products is significant, a higher penalty is more efficient than a larger ratio of green
product requirement.
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4 Analysis of the portfolio standard in labor markets
Our principle can generally apply to other policies that promote or restrict activities yield-
ing positive or negative externalities. For example, hiring physically handicapped workers is
considered to be socially desirable. In this case, the government can regulate the ratio of hand-
icapped employees among all employees in a firm, and if a firm does not meet (overachieve) the
regulation, the firm pays a penalty (obtains a subsidy). The Japanese government formulated
such a regulation by the Act for Promotion of Employment of Persons with Disabilities (Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2019). In this section, we extend our model to investigate
this regulation.
There are two inputs, labor inputs of non-handicapped and handicapped employees. We
consider an n-firm symmetric oligopoly market wherein each firm i chooses li ≥ 0 (number of
non-handicapped employees) and hi ≥ 0 (number of handicapped employees). Let qi = f(li, hi)
be the production function, where qi ≥ 0 is firm i’s output. LetQ ≡
∑n
i=1 qi be the total output.
We assume that f is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and increasing. The
inverse demand function is p(Q) and p′ < 0 as long as p > 0.
The government regulates the ratio of handicapped employees as hi/(li + hi) ≥ r, where
r ∈ [0, 1]. Firms that fall short of targets pay the penalty (or procure permits) according to the
level of shortage, and firms that overachieve the targets receive the subsidy (or sell permits).
Let t ≥ 0 be the level of unit penalty (subsidy). The government chooses t and r.
Firm i’s profit is
πi ≡ p(Q)qi − wLli − wHhi + b(li, hi)− t[rli − (1− r)hi],
where wL and wH are the wages of non-handicapped and handicapped employees, respectively,
and b(li, hi) is the private (internalized without this regulation) benefit function. b(li, hi) is
twice continuously differentiable, convex, and ∂b/∂hi ≥ 0. We assume that labor markets are
perfectly competitive and firms are price takers in the labor markets (i.e., wL and wH are given
exogenously).
The employment of workers, especially handicapped workers, may yield positive externali-
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ties that the government is concerned with. Let B(L,H) denote the benefit of the externalities
where L ≡
∑n
i=1 li and H ≡
∑n
i=1 hi. We assume that it is twice continuously differentiable,
convex, and satisfies ∂B/∂L ≥ 0 and ∂B/∂H ≥ 0. In other words, the employment of both
handicapped and non-handicapped workers do not yield negative externalities, although we







(wLli + wHhi − b(li, hi)) +B(L,H).
The first-order conditions of profit maximization for firm i are
p+ p′qi − wL +
∂b
∂li
− tr = 0, (7)
p+ p′qi − wH +
∂b
∂hi
+ t(1− r) = 0. (8)
Assuming a unique interior solution, these conditions lead to the market equilibrium outcomes.















Assuming a unique interior solution, these conditions lead to the socially optimal outcomes.
Proposition 2 The socially optimal outcome is never achieved by the regulation.
Proof See the Appendix.
As mentioned above, it is natural to assume that hiring non-handicapped workers does
not yield negative externality. Because the regulation provides a disincentive for hiring non-
handicapped workers, the employment level of non-handicapped workers becomes suboptimal.
Therefore, in contrast to the green portfolio standard, this policy always causes welfare loss.
5 Concluding remarks
This study investigates green portfolio standards with monetary penalty for firms that fall short
of targets. We show that this policy is efficient only if the negative externality of non-green
product exceeds the threshold value. This result implies that green portfolio standards are
8
not efficient if the purpose of the policy is only to promote green products, whereas they are
efficient for restricting non-green products.
In this study, we do not explicitly consider other environmental policy tools, such as carbon
pricing, which may affect the costs of firms and/or demand for green and non-green products.
Investigating the relationship between optimal green portfolio standards and carbon pricing
remains for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1







y∗i = tr. (11)
Because t ≥ 0 and r ∈ [0, 1], this equality never holds if (6) is satisfied.
(ii) As shown in the proof of (i), the socially optimal outcome is achieved only if (6) is not
satisfied. Substituting (11) into (3) and comparing it with (5), we obtain t∗. Substituting t∗
into (11), we obtain r∗. Note that t∗ ≥ 0 and r∗ ∈ [0, 1] because −∂pX/∂Y ≥ 0, −∂pY /∂Y ≥ 0
and (6) is not satisfied. ■
Proof of Proposition 2
Comparing (9) and (7), we find that the socially optimal outcome is achieved only if p′qi− tr =
∂B/∂L. Because p′qi − tr < 0 and ∂B/∂L ≥ 0, this equality never holds. ■
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